On May 19, 2024, a helicopter carrying Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi and foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian crashed in a remote area, leaving no survivors. Blink and you may have missed it; the news cycle did not linger long and has quickly moved on to bigger things. While there may not be a hidden conspiracy behind this seemingly random event, its subtle implications for Iran’s political present and future are palpable in the aftermath.
Understanding those implications requires a basic knowledge of the governmental power structure in Iran. There are a lot of parallels between the nominal structure of the Iranian government and the makeup of the U.S. federal government; both have a president elected by the people, a legislative branch (bicameral in the U.S. and unicameral in Iran) and a Supreme Court. Similar basic structure is where the similarities end; the defining feature of power in Iran is the existence of a Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader holds direct power over the president, appoints half of the members of the Council of Guardians (who in turn are responsible for keeping the laws produced by the legislative branch compatible with Islamic law) and effectively controls appointments to the Supreme Court.
This key figure demonstrates how the Iranian government is defined by Islamism; the country is largely governed by a theocratic authoritarian regime. Accordingly, the death of Iran’s president is not that important; it won’t have sweeping effects on policy or hugely disrupt the functioning of the government. However, while the immediate material effects of Raisi’s death may be minimal, more subtle consequences are inescapable in the wider context of Iran.
Politically, Raisi came from Iran’s conservative Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces political organization, and fell completely in line with the Supreme Leader. His time in power was defined by staunch anti-United States and anti-Israel policy; however, he was also somewhat cautious and willing to engage diplomatically if not compromise often. Before his death, talks were set up with the U.S. in order to prevent the war on Gaza from turning into a wider Middle Eastern conflict. Most likely, nothing will change with Raisi’s successor; this strategy of making intense moves but not crossing any dangerous boundaries with the U.S. has proved successful for Iran in its foreign policy goals.
Symbolically, Raisi’s death exemplifies the instability Iran faces both internally and abroad. Raisi has long been seen as a natural successor to the current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His death throws a wrench in that plan, especially as Iran faces internal protests, corruption, economic issues and tensions with Israel. The Iranian public in particular is frustrated with their government, most recently seen with the extensive protests after the murder of Mahsa Amini by police in late 2022, and Iran’s strict mode of governance with little hope for change directly feeds that instability. The citizenry is indifferent to elections where critics of the system are disqualified, and see little hope for a less repressive future through official pathways. Raisi’s death is just another hard pill to swallow for a frustrated population in the medicine cabinet of Iran’s current struggles.
Around the world, the main reaction to Raisi’s death by Iranian communities has been either hope or fear. Not grief. To the millions of Iranians in diaspora, Raisi’s death is two things: first, it is the end of a person who may have stood as a hallmark of Iran’s oppressive regime but was equally an expendable part of it, and second, it is a small blow that may ramp up bureaucratic infighting, opening the way for popular push back and protest. While Raisi’s death on its own was no huge blow to Iranian stability, and many fear that if anything, all that it will bring is more repression, these hopeful and fearful reactions show that Iranians are ready for change. This may be the time to make it.
Iran’s near future following Raisi’s death seems set in stone. While his death may have disrupted expectations for the personnel of the country’s future, the system will ensure that another hardline figurehead is elected president. The successor to the Supreme Leader is unsure; there is infighting within the conservative side of Iran’s elite, and the crash opens the gate for someone to seize an advantage in this period of regime change in Iran. However, apart from that ultimate successor, Raisi’s death has no great disruptive promise for the future of Iranian bureaucracy. More pressingly, the general apathy and disillusionment of Iran’s citizenry will remain, and only time will tell where that frustration leads.
